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15. Right-Wing Extremist Y outh: Motivations for Exiting 
the Right-Wing Extremist Scene and Clique Structure 
Saskia Bollin, Corinne Sieber, Nina Studer, Ueli Mäder, Wassilis Kassis 
In recent decades, research on right-wing extremism has mainly addressed the pre-
conditions and mechanisms that lead to right-wing extremism among the young. But 
which factors support the motivation to disengage and dissuade young people from 
taking an active part in the right-wing extremist scene? In our three-year longitudinal 
study (2003 - 2006) we attempted to discover the various injluencing factors and to 
weight them. In the present report, we focus in particular on the question of how the 
different structures of right-wing extremist groups influence the development of a 
motivation to exit the scene. W e also look at what determines the subsequent process 
of distancing oneself from that scene. 
Right-wing extremist orientation patterns 
What is this right-wing extremist scene from which youths should distance them-
selves? Right-wing extremist groups cultivate specific values and express them in the 
form of political demands and/or activism that ranges from provocative to violent. 
The attitudes espoused are National Socialist, anti-Semitic, racist, sexist, and authori-
tarian (Studer 2005). 
In our study, we wanted to work to bring the disintegration and dominance hypotheses 
together. Our own work (see Kassis 2005) indicates it makes no sense to prolong the 
dispute between »dominance orientation,« as an expression of structurally transmitted 
right-wing extremism (see Rommelspacher 1998; 1993) and »disintegration theory,« 
which explains right-wing extremism as a product of the social disintegration of the 
individuals studied ( compare Heitmeyer 1995a; 1995b; 1992a; 1987). Rommel-
spacher and Heitmeyer, the main proponents of these two hypotheses, have both 
stated repeatedly that this polarization is senseless and that what is required is an inte-
grated approach (see Heitmeyer 1990; 1994). 
Instead, we proceed from the assumption that the locations where social deficits can 
be found in right-wing extremist youth are not necessarily the same locations where 
the problems arise. We quite often see problems that stem from society and social 
structures in the families of right-wing extremist youth, for example. At the same 
time, however, each family - with its specific socialization constellation - develops 
specific ways to deal with its problems. · 
Following Heitmeyer (1992b), a right-wing extremist orientation contains two basic 
elements that are decisive. One is an ideology of inequality, or dominance orienta-
tions (see Rommelspacher 1998), that can be expressed in regarding certain persons 
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as inferior, and in demanding exclusion of foreigners through unequal treatment, 
whether socially, economically, culturally, legally, or politically. The other is an 
acceptance of violence, which can range from the conviction that violence inevitably 
exists (approval ofunequal treatment), through the approval ofviolent acts by others, 
to a person's own willingness to use violence and actually committing violent acts. A 
young person is thus defined as completely detached from the right-wing extremist 
scene only when he or she casts aside ideas of inequality, such as racist prejudice, as 
weil as the acceptance of violence associated with those ideas, and also breaks off 
contact with »comrades« in the scene (Studer 2005, 6). 
Data of 67 interviews and 100 standardized questionnaires 
The basis of our empirical research consisted of 67 interviews, in which participants 
where asked about their biography, attitudes, experiences in a right-wing extremist 
group or scene, and exiting from the scene, in the context of family and groups. 
In total, 40 persons, ranging in age from 14 to 35, participated (35 men and 5 
women). They had either been part ofthe right-wing extremist scene, in varying con-
texts, or were still integrated in the scene when data was first collected. Participants 
were generally aged between 18 and 23. Two-thirds ofthe participants were between 
15 and 20. At the time of the first interview, 16 persons had already left the right-
wing extrer~list scene and 9 were still »clique members« with regular contact to the 
right-wing extremist scene. lt was unclear for 15 of the participants whether they 
should be categorized as clique members or as drop-outs from the scene, due to their 
attitudes and their irregular (or sparse) contacts. Precisely these participants were of 
central interest in the analysis, as their ambivalent status helped reveal factors that 
either promoted or impeded disengagement from the scene in particularly clear 
fashion. 
Ofthe 40 youth who participated in the first interview, 27 (24 men and 3 women) took 
part in the second interview (68 percent). Two youths were members of right-wing 
extremist cliques and six persons had still some sort of irregular contacts to the scene. 
19 ofthem had left the right-wing extremist scene. Out ofthe 19 youths who did not 
belong to the scene anymore, five boys exited the scene while the empirical research 
was taking place. Two of them were clearly integrated in the scene at the first inter-
view; the other three belonged to the ambivalent cases. 
During the analysis of our extensive data, we also conducted conversations with two 
sets ofparents ofyouths who did not participate in the study. Their insights supported 
our findings. 
Each interview lasted from one and a half to two hours. In addition, the participants 
had to fill out three questionnaires at intervals of six months each. 
What are we able to read out ofthis data set? In the main, it provides an interpretation 
of what the interviewees experienced (Rosenthal, 1995). Thus, when participants 
explained their membership in a right-wing group, the reason(s) for their leaving, and 
their current values and attitudes, then this involved subjective ascription of meaning 
and coherence. 
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However, two factors allowed us to find latent structures in the data as weil. First, we 
added questions which seemed relevant from a social science point of view. In addi-
tion to demographic details, we also collected information about their peer relations in 
and outside the scene, their other interests and hobbies, their families, and their own 
clique. We included specific statements in the questionnaire as codes in order to dis-
cover their attitudes toward inequality and their acceptance of violence. We then 
focused on contextual and intervening factors that might support the motivation to 
exit. Second, we compared the arguments of group members, ambivalent youths, and 
youths who had quit the scene. Our analysis is based on the entire dataset, treated as 
one case. In other words, a category that was created to define a particular aspect must 
fit logically into all the other 39 interviews. For example, we labelled one key cate-
gory of exit motivation »burnout«. We found typical burnout symptoms in cases with 
an early fixation on right-wing attitudes, a clear (ideological) identification, the will-
ingness to take over a main function in the scene, and a personal need to effect some-
thing. W e could not find the same symptoms in other cases where interviewees had 
not taken over such a prominent role in the scene and did not show a strong belief in 
racist theories. This example indicates that the reasons for exit are not - as is often 
assumed - simply a question of age. 
With this approach and theoretical sampling using a longitudinal design we were able 
to meet the criteria ofthe »grounded theory« in the sense used by Strauss and Corbin 
(1996). 
A tight-knit, exclusive society 
As Studer (2005) describes it, right-wing extremist cliques are a relatively new aspect 
ofyouth culture. Right-wing cliques have achieved a significant public presence since 
the early 1990s. They now define their own arenas of action through having their own 
place, spaces and time, and pursue »politics in the street« (Hafeneger and Jansen 
2001 ). They cultivate a clearly defined subculture that is expressed through clothing, 
symbolic emblems, and joint actions that put racist-nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas 
on show. This is a tight-knit, exclusive society that seeks to defend itself against 
»external enemies« and that is defined by its political ideology (Studer 2005, 6). As a 
result, anti-Semitic thinking comes in even in the absence of any direct contact with 
Jews. 
Highly exaggerated values of comradeship, solidarity, honour, and loyalty make 
disengagement from the scene difficult (Studer 2005, 6). At the same time, the youth 
is integrated in a social network that hardly allows for emotional or confidential rela-
tionships. 
Group cohesion is safeguarded continuously using three central modes or mecha-
nrsms: 
1) through discourses of group and nation, and corresponding mechanisms of inclu-
sion and exclusion that trigger the construction of images of the enemy and processes 
of depersonalization, which under certain conditions can favour physical violence; 
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- through ritualized collective action that allows a collective identity to grow and 
that devalues personal identity, or reduces the ability for autonomous, individual 
action; 
- through distinctive clothing and music that set the scene apart. 
The degree of organization varies strongly among right-wing extremist youth more 
firmly bound into the scene. Case studies and quantitative investigations (see Eckert, 
Reis and Wetzstein 2000; Hafeneger and Jansen 2001; Hafeneger 1993) suggest that 
the cliquish character of these groups, measured by the degree of radicalization of 
ideas about inequality and the group members' readiness to use violence, can be 
»soft,« »medium,« or »hard.« Hafeneger's findings indicate that »soft« or »softer« 
cliques tend to contain younger juveniles ( aged 14 to 17), while members of 
»medium« to »harder« cliques are typically 18 to 23 (Hafeneger and Jansen 2001, 
39). 
Our most important findings concem the quite variable degree of societal integration 
found in these types of cliques (also confirmed by Eckert et al. 2000, 19). Young peo-
ple in »softer« cliques are socially integrated in other groups that are encouraged or 
tolerated by society at !arge, including as Iocal clubs and associations (fire depart-
ment, sports clubs, and others). They also have contacts to other young people outside 
the right-wing extremist scene. At the same time, while their relations with family and 
school are somewhat strained, they can be still be seen as functioning (see Hafeneger 
and Jansen 2001, 212). 
Members of»medium« and especially »hard« cliques, in contrast, have either cut off 
relations to outside persons or reduced them to the level of services or favours. Rela-
tionships to school, family, and the adult world in general are severely disturbed. With 
»medium« cliques, however, their members still have some >threads< tying those to 
young people outside the right-wing extremist scene. 
In general, the groupings are under little adult control, and a strong repressive pres-
sure rules with respect to assertion ofthe selfby the individual. All those in the group 
mu~t obey the group authority, and distance themselves from other groups through 
the1r appearance, actions, and provocative behaviour if they are to survive in the 
group. The strong intemal pressure leads to dangerous group-dynamic processes and 
to an escalation of violence. 
Right-wing extremist groups are mainly made up of young men. But some young 
women, not content to only remain in the role of girlfriend of a member, are them-
selves members of right-wing extremist groups. In addition to girlfriend of a mem-
ber (dependent status), we found two further types offemale member: the co-initia-
tor, a recognized member ofthe group who exercises core functions but must assert 
herselfin_the male-dominated scene using the same means, and the sympathizer, an 
accepted mdependent member of the group who tends to continue to take a classical 
girl's role (supportive person in the background). 
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Four types of cliques 
The right-wing extremist scene has a heterogeneous structure, and four types of 
cliques can be distinguished. 
- The Ioose alliances are !arge groups. They have defensive ideas about inequality. 
In addition, the organization has a formally open structure with a shallow, two-level 
hierarchy (core members and sympathizers) and a low level of politicization. These 
loose alliances have a young age structure (aged 12 to 18). These are mixed-gender 
groups that favour meeting at public gathering places like railway stations. . 
- The patriotic-nationalistic groupings are !arge groups. They also have defensive 
ideas about inequality, but they are better organized than the loose alliances. They 
have a three-level hierarchy (leader, core member, sympathizer) and a high level of 
politicization and organization. The age structure is mixed. Young ~ales ':"ith good 
middle-class backgrounds predominate. Political aims are important, mcludmg verbal 
disassociation from right-wing parties and extreme right-wing skinheads. 
- The informal youth cliques are small groups. They have ambivalent ideas abo~t 
inequality and act, at times, offensively to support their views. In addition, the orgam-
zation has a semi-formal structure with a three-level hierarchy (leader, core member, 
sympathizer) and a low-to- medium level of politicization. Comp~re~ to l~ose ~11!-
ances, these groups are more organized, but in contrast to the p_atn~t1c-nat~onahst1c 
groups, they are Jess political and more closed. The ~ge structun~ 1s m1xed. Girls make 
up about one-quarter ofthe members. Public and pnvate_gathenn~ places are pop~!ar 
with these informal youth cliques. As to background, mtact, m1ddle-class fam1hes 
predominate. The within-group relationships are more intense and more constant, due 
among other things to the small group structure. 
_ The comradeships are small groups. They hold hardened, offensive ideas about 
inequality. In addition, the organization has a fonnally closed structure, of a »secret 
society« type, with a two-Ievel, strict hierarchy (leaders. and core members) and a lo':" 
Ievel ofpoliticization. Political participation is not an a1m. The »system as enemy« is 
the predominant attitude. The strict organization ofthe group does not allow for sym-
pathizer status. This type of clique tends to be m~de up of youn~ men who are some-
what older than in the other groups (20 to 30) w1th extreme att1tudes _and/or ~syc~o-
logical problems. Women are not desired and ar~ t~erefor~ very ?1uch m th~ mmonty. 
The »comradeships« see themselves as elites w1thin the nght-wmg extrem1st scene. 
Entering the right-wing extremist scene 
With the exception of comradeship, right-wing extremist groups have a relativ~ly 
accessible opportunity structure, and no special abilities are reqmred for membership. 
Tobe recognized within the group, it is sufficient to show an acceptance ofthe group 
opinions. · · h h · f t 
If one Iooks at the course of a >career< in this context - startmg w1t t e _mo~iva ion ? 
enter this scene, through the characteristics of members,. and to t.he motivation to exit 
again and adapt »anew« to society - we found two specdiable lmes of development 
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in our qualitative data set: one is oriented toward compensation, the other toward 
ambition. 
[Lines of development are empirically based on the methodological requirement of a 
systematic and transparent »construction of types« (see Kluge and Kelle 1999). The 
lines differ with respect to their extemal heterogeneity (at the level ofthe type) but are 
also characterized by the intemal heterogeneity oftheir attributes and their (meaning-
ful) interrelationships (at the level ofthe type). When referring to youths belonging to 
a particular line of development, we use the term »type«: compensatory type and 
ambitious type.] 
The concept of a line of development helps in understanding the role ideology plays in 
the course of group membership, and also indicates the most probable motivations for 
exit. Tobe able to offer support for youths in the exit process, it is important to under-
stand their entire careers in the right-wing extremist scene. The links between a line of 
development and the processes and motivations for exit are detailed below. 
- In the foreground of the compensatory line of development is satisfaction of 
social, emotional, and/or needs specific to the life phase, such as needs arising during 
pub~rty and transitions (e.g., leaving school, choosing a vocation, becoming self-sup-
portmg). Such youths are less at risk of embarking on longer right-wing extremist 
careers, and have little political or ideological motivation for entering the scene. The 
c~mpensato1?' type prevails in groups that meet in public and are discemibly right-
wmg extrem1st. In such groups, most participants have completed secondary school. 
The ~ompe~satory typ~ also includes those who have fled into the seeming stability of 
the nght-wmg extrem1st groups due to instability in their own social environments. 
They may intemalize right-wing extremist attitudes that were initially unimportant to 
them. 
-: The_ ambition~d lin~ of development is found in the more ideologized forms of 
ng~t~wmg extrem1sm, smce the motivations for joining the scene is ideological and 
pohtical. Early on, say from age 10 to 15, its members are fixated on questions of 
val~es and the search for meaning. In the foreground is the motivation to change 
soc1ety,_ and to do so by strengthening the ambitions found in the right-wing scene. 
D~termmants ~f~em~ership here are found in family structures and attitudes, person-
ahty charactenstics (hke stubbornness or a tendency towards extremism in attitude 
and ~ehaviour), and early, unresolved experiences as victims. These youths tend to 
stay m th~ scene longer, and are from relatively mixed social backgrounds. The age 
structure 1s heterogeneous and includes adults. 
Disengagementfrom the right-wing extremist scene 
Ou~ researc~ team_ discovered six factors that were decisive for developing the moti-
vat10n to ex1t the nght-wing extremist scene. 
a) The right-wing extremist group as a dysfunctional system. For one the network 
of soci~I »comradeship« is not supportable over the longer term. For' another, the 
group mterferes with or hinders relationships and exchange with other systems 
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(including other importance reference groups such as family, peers not part of the 
scene, neighbourhood acquaintances, or sportsmates ). 
The uniting, and binding, element in the group is not individual affection but an ideal 
of »comradeship.« Personal problems are ignored, and fear, sorrow, and grief are 
considered weaknesses. Friendly relations take place more at the outskirts of group 
activities, and they help promote reasons for exiting the group and disengaging from 
its collective identity ideals. If there are internal conflicts, these social deficits in the 
relationship pattem within the group quickly leads to splitting away from the group. 
Perceived contradictions between the maxims communicated by the group and its 
actions in practice also promote disengagement. Those of the >compensatory type< 
gain a sense of the group as dysfunctional more quickly than do those of the >ambi-
tioned type<. In addition, those in »comradeships« and »informal youth cliques« often 
perceive such dysfunctionality much later - the former because the >comradeship< 
does not permit any other relationship experiences at all, and the latter because there 
are stronger mutual personal (protective) feelings of commitment in the smaller 
groups. 
b) Positive contacts with »outsiders/foreigners.« Positive experiences with enemy 
groups lead to a breaking down ofideas ofinequality, ifthe experiences occur under 
certain conditions, in particular, repeated positive contacts. This happens in situations 
in which there is a need to cooperate, for example, if people live together in an insti-
tution or ifthey share leisure-time interests. Indirect contacts via colleagues who have 
good relationships with foreign youths also have an encouraging effect. Young ~er-
sons ofthe >compensatory type< involved in »loose associations« or »patriotic/nat1on-
alistic groups« tend to have more opportunities ofthis kind in their free time. 
c) A Jack of effectiveness regarding political/ideological am~itions: ~n or~er tobe 
taken as serious social actors, right-wing extremists need social leg1hmat10n. And 
yet they also engage in conscious provocation. In both_ types noted ab?ve, young 
persons who are motivated to exit the right-wing extrem1st scene say their member-
ship is »useless.« The violence itself seems more and more pointle~s, and even those 
who are ideologically-inclined, and who belong to a »comradesh1p«, come to f~el 
similarly. They experience a Jack of socio-political effective~ess that acc~mpames 
their marginal standing, and they do not feel that they are bemg taken senously as 
persons. . 
d) Satiation of Iived-out needs. Group life proves mono~onous, ~speciall_y for the 
>compensatory type<. The constant hostilities, arguing dunng pubhc confü~ts, con-
frontations with the police, and court proceedings become a burden and a stram. There 
is Iittle time to recover, as group members cannot withdraw for reasons_ o~ group sol-
idarity, and their private opportunities for rest and relaxation are very hm1ted. Mem-
bers also become oversaturated as a result of a fixation on particular thought pattems, 
though without them ever being discussed. Both »comra_de~hips« a~d »patriotic/ 
nationalistic groups« conduct debates on fundamental pnnc1ples, w1t~ ~he group 
therefore undergoing a certain cognitive development, the »loose associah~ns« and 
the »informal youth cliques« do not get any further than hackneyed phrases p1cked up 
in the scene. 
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e) Burnout. Burnout symptoms are found mainly in the >ambitioned type< that asso-
ciates in »comradeships.« The symptoms reflect overly high personal expectations 
of one's own effectiveness and a sometimes strong need for recognition. The effort 
expended and the results achieved are disproportionate, particularly for those in 
leadership positions. The social contacts revolve almost exclusively around personal 
~ngagement. Reconciliation between the demands of the scene and responsibilities 
m other areas of life is perceived as difficult, which ultimately leads to disengage-
ment. 
f) ~~iminal procee~in_gs are perceived as a strain. Researchers have conflicting 
op1mons whether cnmmal proceedings motivate young people to exit the scene. 
Criminal proceedings do promote disengagement, if they go into effect soon after the 
criminal o~fence, a~d if the young person is required by the court to perform a per-
so~al, ta~g1ble serv1ce such as community service. However, the stronger the identifi-
cat~on w1th the group, the more that likely that the criminal proceedings enhance and 
vahdate that person's status and value within the group. This negative effect is found 
mainly in the »comradeship« and »informal youth clique« Types. 
Further injluences on the motivation(s) to exit 
Contextual conditions can variously reinforce or weaken the effect ofthe six exit fac-
t~rs described above. We established two main categories of indirect influences on 
d1sengagement: 
Th~ first ~onsi~ts of all personal influences. This includes developmental tasks 
~ch1eved, 1den~1ty-creating capital (hobbies, talents, success experiences, and the 
!1ke), p~rsonaht~ characteristics, and biographical aspects. To young persons with 
mterestmg hobb1es and other interests, the right-wing extremist group usually does 
n~t ~ontribute any further in content/substance. In the case of the >patriotic/nation-
ahstic< group and the >comradeship< group, it develops further only to a small 
extent. 
The moti~ation to exit the scene is also affected by social influences. They include the 
type of ch~ue, the person's position in the clique, peer network, family, the public, 
~nd the soc~al pressure to adapt. The more deeply one enters into the scene, the more 
hkely prev1~us contacts_ will be broken off. This is the case particularly with the 
»co~rad~sh1p<~ type, as 1~ makes h~avy demands on its members' time. A leadership 
P_O~I~IOn m a chque - tha! 1s, detaching from the clique context and taking over respon-
sibihty_ for t_he w_hole chque - can also trigger a phase of retlection. The right-wing 
extrem1st chque 1s then seen from a different perspective, and it is one that members 
must be able to identify with. 
The mor~ radical a _group is, and the more a young person feels integrated in it, the less 
op~o~mty there 1s to perceive and even concede the possibility of conflicts and 
obJect10ns. 
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Consequences of leaving the scene 
The course of exiting the scene is both various and problematic, depending on the type 
of clique and the function of the person leaving the group. Exiting »comradeships« is 
difficult due to the possibility ofbetrayal. A young person who has left the group can 
be seen by the remaining members as a personal disappointment and a breach oftrust, 
but also as a threat. Acts of revenge taken out on the person who has Ieft can 
strengthen and stabilize the group once again. 
In the »loose alliances,« arbitrary developments in the inner life ofthe clique are pos-
sible. Dangerous group dynamics and bullying are characteristic. Exiting the scene 
can therefore take a difficult course. Because ofthe size and the personal relations in 
the »informal youth cliques«, the clique structure is not in itself decisive for the like-
lihood that exiting will be difficult. In »patriotic-nationalistic groups,« involvement 
and exit depend on political conviction, and therefore take an unproblematic course. 
Leaving the Scene while Remaining Engaged? 
How can one define »leaving« in this context? When has a young person truly exited 
the scene? We observed three possibilities: 
Disengagement. We call young persons disengaged if they no longer have contact 
with the group and the scene, and if their ideas of inequality have become much m~re 
moderate. No longer associating with their old clique or the scene, they also otherw1se 
prefer personal relationships that are independent of any dominant group identity. 
They apparently no longer hold with right-wing extremist thinking, and we find no 
indications ofunconscious right-wing extremist attitudes in their interview responses 
otherwise. 
Exiting without disengagement. lf young persons maintain .i~eas ~bout in~quality -
consciously or not - after leaving the group, we speak of »exitmg w1thout d1sengage-
ment.« Here young persons ofboth types proved equally affected. So we still wish to 
discover the significance of giving up inequality and dominance and the proc~ss of 
Jeaving violence behind (see Bauriedl 2001) by examining it in relation to our mves-
tigation ofyoung people's social identities. . . . 
For the >compensatory types<, who entered the scene with little to no p~ht1cal ?r 1deo-
logical motivation, low identification does not lead to conscious retlectlon o.n 1d~as of 
inequality. Looking back, after leaving, they call their group ~~mb~rsh1p »Just a 
phase,« and do not engage in differentiated retlection as to the ~oht1cs m.volved. As a 
result, they also persist in their ideas of inequality, without bemg cons~1ously aware 
they are doing so. For this reason, it is not exactly correct to speak of »Just a ph~se.~< 
For the >ambitioned types<, as a consequence of strong identification and staym~ m 
the group longer, right-wing extremist attitudes can become more fixed. Ideolo~~cal 
thinking leaves its mark and can not be broken down f:om one. day to the nex~. CntI~al 
examination of ideological fragments is made poss1ble mamly through d1scusswn 
with others. 
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Joining a right-wing political party. This alternative is mainly chosen by the >ambi-
tioned type<. The danger here is that ideas ofinequality are not abandoned but instead 
rationalized. In the right-wing party realm, those who have exited from an extremist 
group finds a socially recognized confirmation of their fundamental convictions, if in 
a more compact form. However, he has to hide this due to the official status of the 
party. As a result, the young person does not look back and reflect upon his or her 
right-wing extremist »phase.« 
All three ofthese paths are accompanied by distancing oneselffrom the personal use 
of violence. When the clique context ends, committing acts of violence oneself 
becomes quite out ofthe question. 
What da these results mean in practice? 
When investi~at_in? disengagement processes in right-wing extremist juveniles or 
yo_ung adults, 1t 1s 1mportant to understand that we are not dealing with processes of 
pnmary or seconda1?' prevention. Instead, we are dealing with young people who 
have already »sunk mto the brown swamp.« This is about extricating young people 
who have already '.allen in. While we may hope to see the young people pull them-
selves out o~ the1~ own acc?rd, th~t hope is an overly optimistic and passive 
~pproach t? nght-wmg extrem1sm. lt 1s also a myth that falling in, as weil as »pull-
mg out« w1ll leave no traces on the personality or on the social environment of these 
young people. 
With the help of the six factors that we have identified as decisive in the decision to 
exit the scene, it is possible to support a person's motivation to leave the scene. The 
~actor_s have t~ be en~ouraged using the right instruments. For example, conversations 
m wh1ch the nght-wmg extremist group is scrutinized again and again can strengthen 
the dysfunction factor. 
According to our results, prior to every intervention it is important to clarify the type 
of development and the type of clique. 
In case of ~ompen_sation, the risk ofbeing ideologically affected during ofthe time of 
membersh1p remams. To re-enforce exit, it might be good practice to boost the knowl-
edge of how dysfunctional the intemal system of right-wing extremist groups is, as 
soon as we be_come aware t~at a juvenile is affiliated with one (factor a). For example, 
we can do t~1s ~y confrontmg the leaders of the group with political counter-argu-
~ents that h1ghhgh! the_ contradictions. This is not done with the objective of convinc-
mg the l_eaders, wh1ch 1s hardly possible, but to weaken their effect on the members 
~hose h.ne of development is compensatory. Group members that have not yet 
I~ternah~ed th_e extremist ideology must be aware of other opinions which contra-
d1ct the nght t · t · · . -wmg ex remis pos1t1ons. That requires knowledge and eloquence; oth-
erw1se we run the danger of evoking the opposite effect. 
In case. of an >ambitioned< line of development, with its intemalization of right-wing 
extrem1s! values, we might encourage »bumout« effects (factor e) by pointing to the 
dysfu~ct10nal _elements in the group itself (factor a). For example, if a personal con-
versatlon outside the group context is possible, we could try to force reflection on the 
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erstwhile comrades at a personal level that mocks their »careers as losers« and their 
inconsistent and embarrassing behaviour (see factor c and also Bar, 2003; Hasselbach, 
1993). 
With respect to the type of clique, it is relevant to know beforehand if the youngster is 
member of a loose alliance, a patriotic-nationalistic group, an informal youth clique, 
or a comradeship. If we know the type of clique, we also can appreciate the strength of 
influence the youth is exposed to and the possible risks involved in exiting the scene. 
We also can decide what sort of action is appropriate, and whether it should involve 
the whole group or only the individuals. We assume it is hardly possible to work with 
a comradeship, but loose alliances are more easily influenced because of their open 
structure. Youth workers may be more successful ifthey support altemate local youth 
cultures, particularly ones which provide experiences of one 's own abilities (factor d). 
In case of patriotic-nationalistic groups, we think a content-related conversation ( dis-
cussions about politics but also about individualism, dominant cultures, racism, 
nationalism) would be appropriate (factor c). However, in informal youth cliques, 
where relations are more intense and more constant, it would be better to weaken the 
power of the leader, and to help individuals find new interests and hobbies together 
within others participating in these relatively small groups. 
Indeed, it is a question for those who work with youth, how the factors discussed 
above can be encouraged in the different contexts. We think such a comprehensive 
and differentiated analysis of the target group makes effective intervention possible, 
and it can help to break down the image ofthe unreachable right-wing extremist. 
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